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Following the Project Principle
Project is a term to
conjure zvith in edu-
cational circles today.
While this is particu-
larly true in public
education, it is like-
wise significant that
those engaged in the
task of religious edu-
cation are not far he-
h i n d. The project
principle is more and
more becoming the
dominant note in pro-
gressive philosophies
of education. Y o u
nnll zvant to read and
use these four pioneer
books on project
teaching.
THE PROJECT PRINCIPLE IN RELI-
GIOUS EDUCATION
By ERWIN L. SHAVER
The first book to deal with the project method in the field
of religious education. Theory and practice are alike con-
sidered and such questions as "How can a project be set
going?" "What is the procedure for carrying through a
project?" are considered. Part H, entitled Church School
Projects, consists of descriptions of actual project teach-
ing in typical church schools, and may be purchased sepa-
rately for collateral reading in leadership training classes.
$2.75, postpaid $2.85
Part H reprinted and bound in paper
$1.25, postpaid $1.35
LAW AND FREEDOM IN THE SCHOOL
By GEORGE A. COE
An analysis of the part played by law in the project
method, this book demonstrates the need for "projects
anti," i. e., against wasteful and disastrous activities. It
is of high inspirational quality to the teaching profession.
$1.75, postpaid $1.85
STORIES OF SHEPHERD LIFE
By ELIZABETH MILLER LOBINGIER
A single Sunday-school project based on the life activi-
ties of the early Hebrew shepherds. The material gives
the child many opportunities for drawing, sand-table
work, dramatization, modeling, and construction. For
the second grade of the primary.
$1.50, postpaid $1.60
RELIGION IN THE KINDERGARTEN
By BERTHA M. RHODES
Will help the teacher of whatever degree of experience
present religion to little children in a concrete, simple,
and dramatic way. Plays, pictures, and music are used
extensively with material gathered from the Bible, from
nature, and particularly from the activities of the chil-
dren themselves.
$L75, postpaid $1.85
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
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INTERrRETATIONS INTERPRETED
BY J. GRAHAM EDWARDS
THE relation of man to the world about him, coupled with his
desire to live here and therefore hereafter, gives rise to many
conflicts as man, generation after generation, continuously finrls
himself surrounded by the increasing need for more difficult adjust-
ments. Such adjustments, no matter to what they may be referred,
are usually felt in terms of one's present survival or become the
excuse for one's present survival.
A conflict of large interest is that seen between the Fundamen-
talists and Modernists, or between Science and Theology, or Evo-
lutionists and Non-evolutionists, or Vitalists and Mechanists. The
probable reason for such a state of afifairs is not far to seek, but
such seeking would not help appreciably the solution of the conflict.
The participants in any one or all of the phases of the conflict are
after all rather grotesque. They do not argue for the sake of clarity
or truth but they argue to show that their opinions, no matter how
arrived at, are correct because they happen. to be their opinions, not
because they are even approximately true or correct. Owing to
the desire of one group of participants to iron out the irregularities
and seeming eccentricities of another group, competitive struggling
and juggling is maintained.
Much has been said concerning the contradictions arising as a
matter of course between the facts of science and the dogma of
theology. Since that phase of discussion seems at present to an
extent at least unresolvable, it may not be invaluable to show what
some scientists (many biologists) who have become aroused bv a
multiplicity of accusations hurled at biology and biologists by those
not, or primarily not scientific in concept, have said in fact, justifi-
cation or compromise.
(A2 Tin: (il'F.X COL-RT
When evolution mack- |)ussil)k' a differenl interpretation of pre-
vious notions, opinions and beliefs, and the dynamics of science in
general developed more rapidly than was permitted by the static>
of religion and theology, much alarm was felt in certain quarter^
lest to(j much juggling was going on regarding the meaning and
explanation of the diverse forms of life whereby man tended to
lose dignity and God power. Due consideration seems not to have
been given to the possibility that God was privileged to have acted
in whate\'er way Tie saw fit in so vital a matter as organic evolution.
\o matter how the fashioning and maintenance of life was accom-
plished, it was and is a uniciue process meriting great admiration
even though the admiration must come from so limited a source
as the human mental eye. Those whose minds were not elastic
enough to get this new focus on creation, thought the phenomena
included in evolution to have been the result of the work of the
arch-tiend himself, or of some entit)- with similar attributes. Finally,
the way of the transgressor being proverbially somewhat hard and
senescence not very combative, some believers in the theory of evo-
lution, who also, it appears, wanted to continue evolutionists and
at the same time wa.lk in trodden paths, began to interpret the theory
as follows
:
Evolution, far from being the nightmare of the materially-
minded, is in realit}- tlie result of a stupendous and magnificent
series of processes bv means of which man has attained a complex-
ity of structure and function which means improvement and prog-
ress. The concept of improvement and progress being designed,
of course, to meet the more obvious |)hases of such complexity.
Here was a toothsome morsel which would satisfy those conserva-
tives who could see ( iod from only one angle. And perhaps some
were satisfied. IhU e\ideutl\- those who were led to believe thai
the complexitv of structure and function present in man. meatu
improvement and progress did not realize that such belief was held
arbitrarily, or that man, for all the complexity resulting from his
specialization in structure and function is no more adequate to cope
with his environment or attain a millennium than aniinals less spe-
cialized or complex. It is ob\ious that man as any other animal,
has an environment commensurate with a relative capacity to sur-
\ive it. The human e\e. for example, is no more adequate for
the function it is required to perform, no matter how complex such
function may be, than the pigment-spot of a one-celled animal is
to the function it performs, no matter how limited it may be. Both
IXTKRI'RKTATIOXS I XTKRI'KICTKI i 643
man and the one-celled animals ha\e. as regards a light-sensitive
area, suitable means for responding to the demands of their respec-
tive environments. One is as much handicapped by his complexity
as the other is by its simplicity. The microscope attests the truth
of this and not its falsity.
To seek to interpret complexity of structure or function in terms
uf improvement or progress adds nothing to the practical solution
of human problems. Such interpretations may actually serve to
obscure the problem and prevent such a solution as might otherwise
be practicable. It is worthy of note that the sense of superiorit)-
which many seem to derive from a contemplation of phenomena in
general over which they have a certain control, is owing to human
exploitation of that nature external to human nature. But the com-
plexity which makes possible and ostensibly justifies such exploita-
tion is not without its sinister aspect. The comparison of man
with other animals involves different and more complex reactions
or behavior on the part of man, but is by no mean clear, save by
definition, that such reactions mean better adjustments and essen-
tial superiority. Nature's methods in securing for man so-called
improvement and progress through processes of evolution are to be
regarded with suspicion since the ends attributed to such methods
do not in any real sense justify the means.
The implied assumption that cosmic design has all along been
concerned with man as the ultimate pattern, while very flattering.
is far from being substantiated. If it were substantiated, all of the
available evidence revealing the varied aspects of maneuver dis-
played by this mysterious designer, nature-actor, creator, or inner
perfecting principle, shows clearly how tedious and bungling the
maneuver has been and is no matter if in cosmic or lesser processes
man has finally emerged, or whether he arose by one mythical act
of creation. Man's history since there has been a record, is more
discreditable as dealing with an object issuing from omnipotent
hands than if man had to plow with the assistance of nnlabellable
forces, through tons of colloidal ooze. rec|uiring inconceivably long-
time. The object created cannot be more complex in character than
the agency or agencies creating it, hence man and nature alike must
reflect in their maintenance and operation something of the charac-
ter of their originator. Therefore construction and destruction,
integration and disintegration, life and death, "gcxHl and evil" and
all the category of attributes relating to animate nature—to go no
further—must invvitablv be referred in an entit\ or entities, to a
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process or processes. It is in the confused and confusing attempt to
relate certain phases of man's behavior as well as of nature's in gen-
eral to one entity, agency or cause while the remainder are, in
attempt, related to yet anothe: tnnlx. ajr.-v.-y or c-iuse, that consti-
tutes the most pitiable spectacle for the eye that would like to per-
ceive that truth makes one free, Or that knowledge is edifying, or
that the so-called powerful cerebrations of that most haloed struc-
ture, the human brain really reflect credit rather than discredit on
whatever entity, agency or cause that may cosmologically be re-
sponsible for its present status.
Another evolutionist is of the opinion that evolution has been
accomplished in the past by means of the continuous action of
cooperation or mutual service. It is, he holds, the discovery of this
one fundamental underlying method, common to all creative proc-
esses of nature that constitutes the epoch-making truth which gives
man creative power. lie believes, moreover, that in nature-action.
i. e.. the way natural law and phenomena are manifest, is revealed
the expression of a creative will and that it is in this nature-action
that man may find the instruments of his salvation. He admits,
however, that the processes revealing the creative will are almost
equally destructive and constructive, organizing and disorganizing,
integrating and disintegrating. But despite this sinister duality, he
maintains that nature-action is such that a constructive surplus is
achieved which justifies the duality and constitutes its secret. From
this kind of reasoning he is enabled to deduce that evolution is a
triumph of constructive over destructive processes and accordingly
becomes the immutable pivotal truth around which man must orient
his inward purposes and to this truth conform his conduct rightly
or suffer self-destructive penalties. Likewise nature's way is the
truth man must seek to discover and her methods be accepted as
liis moral code.
Such an interpretation of evolution, of course. ])romises well for
persons who take more kindly to god than to animal ancestry. But
to say that progressive creation is only realizable through better
mutual service or cooperation or that the latter constitutes the great
principle in evolution, gives man no slightest notion of how to apply
the principle, as it may have functioned in evolution, to the solution
of any human problem. Of what service to billions of warring chips
is the knowledge that the cosmic tide in transporting them, does so
by means of methods or principles of cooperation or mutual service
entailing progressive creation, when the very complexity responsible
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for progressive creation, however much brought about by coopera-
tion or mutual service, conditions the horrible friction to which the
chips are subject in their transportation? If cooperation or better
mutual service should by any chance prove to be the great principle
in the evolution of life—something knit of necessity into life's very
fabric—should not the trend of exposition be then directed toward
the kind of cooperation that should operate insofar as such a princi-
ple might be applicable in human cooperation and man might have
consciously the power of constructive rather than destructive coop-
eration or mutual service?
When the attempt is made to reconcile one's hopes and ideals
with the facts of reality, much confusion is to be expected. Such
confusion is indicated by the statement that evolution is now the
immutable pivotal truth around which man must orient his inward
purposes and to it conform his conduct rightly or suffer self-destruc-
tive penalties ; and again that evolution is something which compels
man to accept nature's constructive methods as his moral code, when
nature's methods are almost equally destructive and constructive.
That nature should afford obvious truth or principles and compel
man to conform to them, yet with the compulsion man does not con-
form, he accordingly must suffer self-destructive penalties, aft'ords
a questionable situation in the conduct of nature herself. More-
obvious and postulable than any method, code or principle of nature
whereby man may obtain guidance in making necessary adjustments,
is that nature cannot he personified to include such attributes or
power as are ascribed to her. Neither nature nor evolution is a deus
ex mach'.nj but rather words indicative of phenomena, a microscopic
part of which phenomena man has become aware of in various ways
in the course of time.
Because evolution is a word used to indicate what seems clearly
to have happened in the differentiation of the diverse forms of life,
and because there is that disparity in animal forms or phyla which
appears to have justified man in assuming that he is the apex—the
desired and desirable end of evolutionary processes—is the concli-
sion permitted that nature in producing man by means of such proc-
esses is more constructive than destructive, or that he is actually
more advantaged by his sinisterly attained complexity? A complex
machine is likely to require more attention in its functioning than
a simple one. So it is witli man who usually finds himself more
handicapped by his complexity tlian other animals are by their rela-
tive simplicity.
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One finds it but little clarifying to have discovered for him the
great fundamental truth of cooperation or mutual service when
even the discoverer also admits that there is an ever-present dis-
organization pervading the system or systems of nature—"a univer-
sal incompleteness of administration and a mocking instability of
purpose, where chance creates and chance destroys or nips in the
bud the tender shoots of new-sprung enterprise." And that "life
stands on a meager franchise of the elements—a frail terrestrial
film in an infinite sea of death" ; that "organic evolution consists in
utilizing the scraps in reducing the percentage of error by the actual
process of living and dying—making one in a million fit to survive."
That life should stand on so meager a franchise and constitute so
frail a film and that evolution should involve the use of scraps in
order that one in a million may be approximately fit to survive, i?
staggering to the intellect that seeks intelligence in nature ur in her
methods. Nature is the scrap-pile she is accredited with using. The
intelligence of nature is expressed in scraps. The palpable horror
is that one cannot be sure he really sees the pattern for the scraps.
It is indeed the very scrappiness of nature that explains the origin
and maintenance of so much mental dust.
If one turns for a moment to the point of view of another man
of science, a point of view concerning nature rather different from
the preceding, one find that this scientist sees man preying upon
man (not to mention other animals in general), one a cunning para-
site upon the other finally evoking reactions and consequences that
overtake in catastrophe and cataclysm prever and preyed upon alike.
If this be true, what basis is there for the hope that either through
science or any other agency one may obtain an antidote which will
prevent "service from sinking to servitude and acquisition to rapac-
ity destroying both the master and the slave, the robber and his
prey" ; or "cooperation from swerving into competition and friend-
ship into enmity" entailing "fruitless cycles of unending struggle
between pursuer and pursued, seeker and hider, aggressor and de-
fender that have no outlet but mutual destruction or a deadlock of
perpetual reprisal."
The relation of man U) nature and nature to man, insofar as one
relation may dift'er from the other, constitutes a problem not easily
soluble at present—at least not soluble in sociological terms. In
charmingly erudite statements one finds man discussed as a being
with extracosmic relations—a being now independent of nature.
now dependent on nature for guiding principles. Obviously man
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cannot be regarded at one time as a product of nature and at another
as a being remote from natural processes—a sort of casual spectator
of that nature which he himself is. Care should be exercised in dis-
cussing the man-phase of nature so as to correspond in fact with
discussions of any other nature-phase.
The illumination of darkness is manifest in the attempt to ex-
plain the relation of man to nature by saying that "while man from
time immemorial, has carried his appeals for help, for right and
justice, straight to the supreme court of nature, it was but yester-
day that he succeeded in drawing from her in the doctrine of evo-
lution, a clear declaration of general principles and a broad outline
of nature's methods." Or is it not also pertinent to ask why nature
refused something so fundamental when man has so assiduously
courted her since time immemorial and is her latest and relatively
most perfect creation? Then, too, as it is held, if growth, this spec-
tacular manifestation in animate nature, is perpetually thwarted or
checked by its own successes and again liberated when better ways
for supplying its demands are found, producing an orderly progres-
sion from simple to complex, from disorganization to organization
which evolution is taken to indicate, what evidence is obtained which
will disclose how man is to select more readily better ways of pro-
gressing? Again, if as it is also maintained, "cosmic environment,
from the earlier phases of organic evolution, has been broadly per-
missive for all kinds of life, provided life could find the right wax-
to use it"—are not man and life essentially synonymous and both
confronted with the same difficulties? Environment need not be
permissive for any kind of Hfe unless hfe contains within itself the
means of its own realization. If it should appear that either man
or life, so to speak, is trying to find a right way to live, the congeni-
tal equipment of cosmos contains as reciprocals not only the process,
of living and dying, but of every other process which mutually con-
duces to this end. It is, therefore, impossible to speak of an attempt
of life to find either a right or a wrong wav Id live, for ample evi-
dence is available which indicates equal efl:'ort in either direction.
This is true of the individual, species or race.
The dictum which has been variously formulated and perhaps
with a good motive, although it undoubtedl\ serves to confuse the
uncritical, is that nature's way is the truth man seeks to discover,
or that one overcomes nature by obeying her. This is deceptive, for
nature's way is man's way and one cannot overcome nature with-
out being himself overcome. Ft seems unlikely that man as nature's
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best experiment should or could have become so separated from her
that he has to undergo such violent pursuit in order to discover her
way. Except for the difference in magnitude, one wonders if man
in such ostensible seeking after nature's ways is or can be very dif-
ferent from beavers when they build their dam, or of squirrels when
they store up food, or bears when they hibernate. IVIan does not
seek nor does he have to seek in the way the dictum connotes, to
discover nature's ways. The apparently more conscious desire in
man to attain a better relation with his environment, leads him to
say that he is seeking to discover that which other animals do more
effectively and silently. Man is, it appears, merely azvare of some
of the processes of nature whereby his destiny is controlled. Aware-
ness or so-called conscious manipulation of environmental factors
does not mean control. The slave is not the master because he
obeys the master's dictates. The apple does not overcome gravity
by falling.
One critic of the biological picture which shows nature as selfish
and wantonly destructive says that the picture is morbid and ab-
surdly tragic and that it fortifies a false social philosophy which sees
in social parasitism, in self-aggrandizement, in measureless acquisi-
tion of arbitrary power, the goal of a successful life. A philosophy
which seeks to justify itself by an appeal to the struggle for exist-
ence, the elimination of the unfit and the survival of the fittest. This
morbid and absurdly tragic picture and false social philosophy, this
critic holds, miss the obvious fact that what actually happens in the
struggle of life, is that life always wins and holds on to some incre-
ment of good. Be that as it may, the equally obvious fact is that
"winning" and "good" are not easy to define biologically and one
point of view is just as likely to be correct as another. At any rate
life makes the canvas for whatever interpretations or points of view
the human mind contributes. Man can only paint on this nature-life
canvas with the oil and Inrushes which nature or life itself has fur-
nished. The possibilities for all conceivable interpretations were
innate in nature and life long before biology as a science and at a
time when nature was "discovering" man along with her other dis-
coveries and experiments.
The use of biological terms and data for false social philosophy
sliould occasion no concern for one may be sure that other and equi-
valent terms would not be lacking despite the contributions of any
science. Therefore it is hardly true to say in the case of Germany,
for instance, that she was the first to incorporate into her politics.
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business, religion and philosophy the most pernicious teachings of
the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. For one
knows now or should know that nature in producing pernicious
teachers will also equip them with pernicious teachings all science
to the contrary notwithstanding.
Biologists as well as those who speak only in the name of biology-
might well give more attention to a consideration of the fact that
whatever is, is natural, no matter how convenient the arbitrary lan-
guage indicating the varied aspects of nature may be. The so-called
orderliness or lawfulness of nature which man thinks or fancies
he has discovered—nay, even produced—is merely his experience
of the phenomenal world. From the available evidence the conclu-
sion may be easily drawn that, no matter how much change in mate-
rial configuration of the animate or inanimate world, there was
never less order at any time of the earth's history, or in cosmos, than
now—less chance, chaos or accident ; more design, purpose or tele-
ology. Everything seems orderly if it can be observed sufficiently
often in closely similar ways. The more acceptable way at present
for man to discover that which he subsequently calls order in the
world about him, is that off"ered by science. If no uncaused phe-
nomenon (so-called noumena are really unanalyzed phenomena) is
found and if certain sequences are repeated in approximately iden-
tical ways under approximately identical conditions, law and order
are thus made possible of definition—but of definition only.
Another singular notion is that selfishness is self-destructive.
The exponent of this notion believes that "Germany's dissolution
will make the world better for the practical lesson it has received
showing that selfishness for nations as for individuals is self-de-
structive." Selfishness, however, in the case of Germany or of any
other nation has not led to self-destruction. Selfishness is primarily
functional in self-preservation. It would be helpful, if true, for the
public to know after thousands of years of increasingly destructive
wars, that selfishness is self-destructive. But selfishness being self-
preservative and Nature a conflict of imperfections, it is probable
that attention could be more successfully directed here when inter-
preting Germany's conduct as well as the conduct of other nations.
Science also as well as selfishness and especially biology since
"the dark and disfiguring shadow of Darwinism fell upon the fields
of life" have been held responsible in \-arious insidious ways for
the growth and also the decay of nations. Germany's growth in
power has been attrilmtcd to the development of her science as well
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as a cause of her destruction. But are the biological sciences or
science in general more di'sfntctrrc than flic truth i<'hich makes one
free. Real science is truth or fact and truth does sometimes make
one relatively free. While scientific instruments and methods are
used in modern warfare and national motives labelled in various
ways, has the use of such instruments or methods revealed methods,
codes or sets of principles different from or stibversive of those
employed by nature in general? Verily history after nature repeats
itself.
Unfortunately it is not clear what value in human terms is to
be assigned to the creative aspect of nature, or what to progress.
Processes of growth and creation as the biologist sees them have
little sociological meaning although the desire is strong to read into
them more than they can support or nature justify. The mere abil-
ity or capacity to differentiate into more complex forms or aspects
of life entailing the accumulation of more complex social and indus-
trial slavery (called organization) may be taken arbitrarily to mean
progress. But what does the "progress" signify or justify? What
rainbow promises are guaranteed in the physics of the spray of com-
plexity, of growth, of creation? How may it be established with
certainty that man through science, pure or applied, is "harnessing"
nature as one aspect of so-called progress, rather than that nature
through science is "harnessing" man just as the development of
industrial organization is binding instead of freeing him? If the
end or purpose of nature's travail is to yield a constructive surplus,
why are "good" and "evil" such dynamic factors in that travail by
means of which "improvement and progress" or "cooperation" real-
ize themselves? Truly the human mind is finite.
Among the scientific protagonists of the theory of evolution who
would coat it with some mentally narcotising substance, one is
found who maintains that evolution oft'ers a rational solution of the
problem of evil. Without pausing to consider of what evil is actually
composed, if it has any composition at all in a biological sense, one
is made curious to inquire if this solution is merely offered tenta-
tively, whether it will take one or more billion years for humanity to
become aware of the offer and what the chances are for its accep-
tance. Because nature, through processes visible to man in terms
of evolution, has enabled him to ascertain his relation to some of
the processes that produced him, it may not be concluded that cos-
mos has been entrusted to his care, or that there will be no cosmol-
ogy or cosmic functioning whether man is aware or not aware.




conscious or not conscious of evolution or cosmic functioning.
Those among men who would control or shape man's destiny, might
well find out from science or other reliable sources, something about
how their destiny is controlled or shaped.
To say that evolution offers a rational solution of the problem
of evil neither states the problem nor discloses how a rational solu-
tion may dift'er from an ordinary one. Since life is a "balance
between constructive and destructive" forces or processes and the
death process a normal part of the life process, the desire for "solu-
tions, improvement and progress, better mutual service" is like a cry
expressing pain—merely incidental to the life-death process. Why
seek to justify or condone nature by saying that progress and creation
are only to be realized through endless strtiggle involving continuous
adjustment, as docs the holder of the view that evolution offers a
rational solution of the problem of evil, when the temporary solace
it may give subserves no valuable end and may indeed excite the
query concerning the meaning for the individual and race of life
itself? Any answer to such a query cannot be other than specula-
tive. In such speculation is the possibility that attention may become
uncomfortably directed to the inadequacy of nature (man thus made
conscious of his confusion at nature's hands) to handle her own
problems ( the creation and maintenance of man being one) in the
ideal way some seem to think and hope man will be enabled to do
by knowing natiu'e better.
As an indication of how even among those with scientific train-
ing, to say nothing of the laity, a simple statement of fact may be
deceptively suljordinatcd to more or less rhetorical display, the fol-
lowing definitions of the aim of science are submitted: "Science aims
to ascertain, as nearly as may be, what that sequence of creative
rightness was in order that she may infer what it shall be." "The
aim of real science—is to know the truth—and the truth alone can
make us free." Both definitions suft"er in directness and clarity
because of the fact that the aim of any real science is the investiga-
tion of phenomena, no matter what motives actuate the investigator
or what results may be obtained from the investigation.
In the second definition of the aim of science given above and
in more historic references, one finds the idea that truth makes one
free. However factual this may be under certain conditions, it
must also be borne in mind that with each increment of knowledge,
the individual or society so enlightened, becomes the more burdened
—burdened by the larger revelation of the processes of nature of
652 THE OPEN COURT
which he or it is a part, and hemmed in by a larger sense of respons-
ibility, or of duty, and of the necessity for an exemplary life.
The untutored man feels himself freer than the tutored in that
he is unmindful of the determinants of his conduct and character.
I5ut this does not alter the actual condition of bondage in either
case. The man of today is bound, as in the past, by the society
he creates, by the industry he is impelled to develop, and by the sci-
ence revealed through him. It is intellectually dishonest to excite
hope for greater harmony of man with his environment by con-
structing a concept of freedom which ostensibly removes him from
the physical slavery from which the concept gets its impetus. The
law that binds the community may set the individual free and the
law that binds the individual may set the community free, but it is
freedom through bondage and bondage through freedom. The
sequences are only rearranged so that relatively different effects are
obtained.
Truth, of course, frequently makes one free of the fears in-
duced bv what hitherto was not understood or could not then be
controlled, but a vicious cycle is engendered bv new fears i rising ir.
place of the old so that society is as much frightened by what is
revealed in the light as by what formerly was hidden in darkness.
Moreover it is only partially clarifying to discuss merely man's con-
trol over nature leading him to feel that he has a directing part in
vital and other phenomena, when he is himself impelled to whatever
he undertakes or accomplishes more inevitably than a slave in a
galley.
In apparently a further effort to placate man and condone nature,
the contention is made that in the relations of animals to each other.
the sacrifice of the individual and the preservation of the group,
operate for the good of the colony, race or species ; that race preser-
vation and evolution is the supreme good and all other considera-
tions of the individual are subordinate to this end. It seems possible
to state this more simply by saying that nature has to care supremely
for the good of the individual in order to care for the colony, race
or species. As a matter of fact nature does not appear to care
for either the individual or race, because it is not within human
comprehension to so diagnose the cares of nature. To personify
nature is a lazy man's way of appearing erudite.
The statement to the eft'ect that scientific means are to be em-
ployed to improve the individual and race does not include anything
concerning for what purpose the improvement is necessary, i. e..
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war or peace, for example, or that such improvement will insure the
individual or race against destruction, or that either will be pre-
served for the larg^er attainment of that which is regarded as the
greatest and most distinctive of human traits, namely, reason and
consciousness. For even with regard to these it is said that they
have revealed a world of evil as well as of good ; a world of struggle
and failure, of suffering and sorrow, of injustice and selfishness, of
disappointment and despair—a world of pestilence and death in
which the innocent suffer and sometimes the guilty; in which evil
is often rewarded and good punished ; in which all higher animals
are born in pain, brought up with measureless care and trouble, live
a life in which struggle and suft"ering are mingled with brief satis-
factions and joys, and without a single exception go on to inevitable
decay and death. Doubtless reason and consciousness justify their
evolution just as certain idealists seem able to justify and explain
soothingly everything in nature—hideous or otherwise. But the
human mind is prone to seek a reason for whatever stimulates it
—
hence mysticism, superstition, logic, science. Man may, in his
awareness of certain phases of the course of nature, postulate direc-
tions as to this course which ostensibly explain, justify or deify it.
But whether man does or does not postulate directions, or whether
he is or is not aware of nature's course, makes little difference to
nature. All the mental excrescence of deists, vitalists, evolutionists,
mechanists, nihilists, or of any variation of these do not and will not
affect that course of nature about which they argue and would con-
tribute the last word. Man talks too much where nature is silent
and where he is logical at all, he uses a logic of necessity rather than
the logic of fact.
The frequent invocation of education for the purpose of improv-
ing the minds of men rather too flatteringly indicates the presence
of minds for which educational machinery might function. Educa-
tion has no power of itself. It is only a label for what sometimes
happens to those who subject themselves voluntarily to mental dis-
cipline. Likewise religion, as though it, too, were a discrete entity,
is to be employed to improve the morals of men, but the moral sense
of man conditioned the development of his religion insofar as his
religion entails a moral aspect.
While biology is the science against which so many spurious
accusations have been made, it does not appear that biology has any
apology to make to society as a whole or in part, neither does nature
require justification for her maneuvers. The charge made that
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iifUher animals nor men can struggle for an existence they alread\
possess, hut that they struggle for improvement and that what is
needed in this struggle is a most significant cooperation ignores the
fact that men and animals alike do struggle for a continuance of
existence whether for impro\ement or otherwise. A most significant
cooperation may he necessary, but what the world needs, it would
appear, is not a statement of the need, but an actual disclosure of
the }nca>is for obtaining and operating this most significant coopera-
tion. Perhaps nature is so light-hearted and playful that she is con-
cealing the means as a practical joke.
The same critical mind that finds animals and men struggling
for improvement and needing a most significant cooperation also
makes the further statement that Darwinism justifies the sensualist
at the trough, h^ishion at her glass, Prussianism at the cannon and
Bolshevism at the prison door. Oi course, none of the above char-
acters has ever been heard of in Darwinism or biology. Darwinism
neither justifies nor attempts to justify any of nature's products.
This function seems to have been appropriated by pseudo-interpret-
ers of Darwinism. The nature which makes the sensualist, the
Bolshevist, the Prussianist and servile follower of Fashion must
l)ear the burden of reproach, if such there be.
\'enders of opiates for social ills have as their stock in trade it
seems two chief brands: one brand functions in the claim that if
evil were lacking good would prevail, at least this is what the claim
can be reduced to. As has been seen, evil is the necessary and
inevitable corollary of good. The other brand functions in embody-
ing what purports to be actual solvents and eradicators of ills and
evil. Thus is found in the latter brand an imperious need of more
mind—more critical thinking, (iiven more mind and therefore
more critical thinking and behold a wretched world made joyous.
But here again one faces the cold fact that in the evolution of what
mind there is. there has been revealed or produced many of the
existing problems which the human environment reflects. As much
as one would like to have faith in the efficacy of more mind, never-
theless it is not the solvent or even salve for human pain and prob-
lems. If everything else in this changing world could be kept con-
stant while the human mind developed efficiency commensurate with
the human problems it has generated by revealing them, one might
lend a favorable ear toward devising ways and means of obtaining
such an increase of mind. At present it does not seem remotely pos-
sible that the kind of mind-incrcasc desired can be obtained biologi-
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cally without the imposition of disproportionately greater and
greater stresses in the social or nervous machinery. The human
mind in the development of its present capacity for dealing with
larger problems usually finds that the relation of capacity to prob-
lem is as embryo to adult. And characteristically embryonic is the
notion of some that though born later the embryo can overtake the
adult. But the adult is as fecund in defeating old age as the embryo
is sterile in attaining its adolescence and maturity. Nature in in-
creasing the load-carrying power of man has always a load equal to
or greater than the increase in ability to carry. The squirrel with a
nut and man with a sack are cciually laden.
Another sample of how evil may be eradicated is found in the
time-binding faculty of man. By virtue of this time-binding fac-
ulty the past is made to function in the present and constructively
reveal the future. The discoverer of time-binding or time-binding
faculty insists that this faculty is restricted exclusively to the human
animal. The mere discovery of this human time-binding capacity,
which the discoverer says functions according to the formula for
geometrical progression, constitutes at last the full and perfect
approach to Utopia.. Of course, the discovery must be proclaimed
at large and such is being attempted. Once man becomes acquainted
with the fact that he is a time-binder, all human difficulties begin
with celerity to vanish and a perpetual millennium is at hand. Obvi-
ously the matter is not so simple. Man, to be sure, may use and does
use helpfully the experience of the individual, species or race to a
relatively much larger extent than other animals in general. The
difference in the use of such experience on the part of man and
other animals is merely one of degree. Moreover, the time-binding
faculty of man lias in its operation soUed no problems whose solu-
tion has not therelj\- conditioned or generated others. Here again
a dissertation on the memory-function of man. racial or otherwise.
by means of which he avoids tomorrow the disagreeable of today or
yesterday, is entertaining, but the relative chaos of the present and
past as compared with the predicted future which the disco\erv of
the time-binding faculty makes possible is no more changed in its
fundamental asj^ect tlian the disco\ery of the law, doctrine, or the-
ory of evolution has changed evolutionary processes. With regard
to evolution, some have sought to keep faith with science and God
by saying that the horror of the processes manifest were and are
justified by a predicted future in which man would evolve into that
jierfection observabk' on1\- on ihe \eiled face of the Creator Him-
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self. If time-binding and evolution were test-tube experiments in
which the reactions therein could be observed until standardized,
predictions might then be made with regard to them with some
degree of reliability.
Finally, is the question of whether the average man can stand
a universe robbed by science of the supernatural and its consola-
tions ; of whether the man of the streets in accepting a mechanistic
conception of life will not be led to such behavior as will jeopardize
the existing social order. The answer to this ciuestion is doubtless
that whenever the man of the streets can grasp a mechanistic con-
ception or any essentially rational conception, he will cease to be
labelled as such, nor will he need the consolation of the supernatural.
The proponent of the question is himself more alarmed by the
steady advance of science into social channels than the interest he
manifests in the common man would indicate. It is the pseudo-
intellectuals themselves, not the average or common man, who are
alarmed over the mechanistic conception. They want to hold with
God and run with science. To the extent that any man can actually
grasp as a real scientist does the scientific or mechanistic point of
view, he becomes a better and more worthy citizen. False inter-
preters of science to the public, mental Bolsheviks and other jug-
glers with fact, however, one may biologically ex]x>ct. like the poor
of whom Christ spoke, to have with one always.
